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Description
Stelzenhaus 'SPAIN' inkl. Rutsche Grün, 248x322x359cm (BxTxH)Kleines Spielhaus fr grossen Spielspass Das Stelzenhaus mit 120cm Podest und Schlafboden sorgt fr grosses Spielvergngen bei den Kindern. Dekorativ und funktional Die zweigeteilte Holztr und die sechs Fenster bringen viel Licht ins Innere dieses Kinderspielhauses und werden inklusive dekorativen Fensterlden und Blumenksten geliefert. Die vier Fenster in der Front sind dabei mit Kunstglaseinsatz (feststehend) ausgestattet. Die zwei Fenster in den
Kleines Spielhaus für grossen Spielspass
Das Stelzenhaus mit 120cm Podest und Schlafboden sorgt für grosses Spielvergnügen bei den Kindern.
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Dekorativ und funktional
Die zweigeteilte Holztür und die sechs Fenster bringen viel Licht ins Innere dieses Kinderspielhauses und werden inklusive dekorativen Fensterläden und Blumenkästen geliefert. Die vier Fenster in der Front sind dabei mit Kunstglaseinsatz (feststehend) ausgestattet. Die zwei Fenster in den Seitenwänden sind offen und lassen sich durch die funktionalen Fensterläden öffnen und schliessen. Die Fensterläden sowie die zweigeteilte Holztür sind dabei mit einem Fingerklemmschutz ausgestattet. -
Spielspass auf zwei Ebenen
Das Spielhaus mit dekorativem Schornstein auf der Rückseite ist mit einem Schlafboden ausgestattet, der durch eine Treppe im Inneren des Spielhauses erklommen werden kann. Das geräumige Spielhaus bietet jede Menge Platz für eine gemütliche Sitzecke und eine Kinderküche. Beachte hierzu auch unser grosses Spielzeug-Sortiment. -
Stabile Grundkonstruktion
Die Grundkonstruktion besteht aus kesseldruckimprägniertem Profilholz und ist somit besonders witterungsbeständig. Die sechs äusseren Stelzen auf denen das Spielhaus thront sind aus 9x9cm starken Pfosten gefertigt. Die inneren zwei Standpfosten sind 6,8x6,8cm stark. Nach vollständiger Trocknung kann das Spielhaus nach Lust und Laune mit einem Farbanstrich gestrichen werden. Wir empfehlen hierzu eine offenporige, hoch pigmentierte Holzschutzfarbe. -
Inkl. Fussboden
Ein Holzfussboden ist im Lieferumfang bereits enthalten. Bitte beachte die Hinweise für ein stabiles Fundament in unserem Download-Bereich. -
Einfacher und schneller Aufbau
Die detaillierte und leicht verständliche Anleitung ermöglicht eine schnelle Montage. -
Inklusive Rutsche
Das 120cm hohe Podest wird inklusive einer Wellenrutsche geliefert, die im Sommer auch als Wasserrutsche genutzt werden kann. -
Dachbelag optional
Aus ökologischem Aspekt wird das Spielhaus wird ohne Dachbelag zur Ersteindeckung geliefert. Wir empfehlen Dachschindeln oder selbstklebende Dachbahn für einen dekorativen und lange haltbaren Dachbelag.
ACHTUNG:
Nicht für Kinder unter 3 Jahren geeignet. Geeignet für Kinder von 3 bis 14 Jahren. Zulässiges Gesamtgewicht Spielhaus: 50kg.
Benutzung nur unter unmittelbarer Aufsicht von Erwachsenen.
Stolper- und / oder Sturzgefahr.
Nur für den häuslichen, privaten Bereich (DIN EN 71-8).
Ausschliesslich für die Verwendung im Freien.
Spielhäuser müssen auf einem festen Untergrund, z.B. Beton oder Fliesen, stehen und dürfen nicht mit Erde, Wiese etc. in Berührung kommen (Gefahr von Fäulnisschädigung).
Die Grundkonstruktion ist in regelmässigen Abständen auf etwaige Beschädigung und Fäulnisbefall zu kontrollieren.
Die angegebenen Masse können geringfügig abweichen.
Aus produktionstechnischen Gründen können Artikelbestandteile wie Abdeckkappen, Haltegriffe, Seile etc. farblich vom Bildmaterial abweichen. Die Abweichungen stellen keinen Reklamationsgrund dar.
Nicht für Kinder unter 3 Jahren geeignet. Geeignet für Kinder von 3 bis 14 Jahren. Zulässiges Gesamtgewicht Spielhaus: 50kg.
Benutzung nur unter unmittelbarer Aufsicht von Erwachsenen.
Stolper- und / oder Sturzgefahr.
Nur für den häuslichen, privaten Bereich (DIN EN 71-8).
Ausschliesslich für die Verwendung im Freien.
Spielhäuser müssen auf einem festen Untergrund, z.B. Beton oder Fliesen, stehen und dürfen nicht mit Erde, Wiese etc. in Berührung kommen (Gefahr von Fäulnisschädigung).
Die Grundkonstruktion ist in regelmässigen Abständen auf etwaige Beschädigung und Fäulnisbefall zu kontrollieren.
Die angegebenen Masse können geringfügig abweichen.
Aus produktionstechnischen Gründen können Artikelbestandteile wie Abdeckkappen, Haltegriffe, Seile etc. farblich vom Bildmaterial abweichen. Die Abweichungen stellen keinen Reklamationsgrund dar.
Technische Daten
| Firsthöhe / Max. Höhe (cm): | 359,60 cm |
| Hersteller: | Prestige Garden |
| Serie: | Madrid |
| Altersempfehlung: | 3 - 14 Jahre |
| Aussenmass: | B x T: 248 x 322,2 cm (ohne Dachüberstände) |
| Podesthöhe: | 119,9 cm |
| Material: | Holz |
| Holzart: | Kiefer |
| Oberflächenbehandlung: | kesseldruckimprägniert |
| Schindelbedarf: | 4 Pakete (optional) |
| Fussboden-Stärke (mm): | 19 mm |
| Fussboden Ausführung: | Fussbodenbretter |
| Pfostenanzahl: | 8 |
| Pfostenankerbedarf: | 8 Stück (separat erhältlich) |
| Pfostenstärke Spielturm (cm): | 9 x 9 + 6,8 x 6,8 cm |
| Farbe: | Braun / Grün |
| Fensteranzahl: | 6 |
| Fenster Ausstattung: | 2 Fenster mit Fensterläden |
| Fenster Ausstattung 2: | 4 feststehende Fenster |
| Lieferumfang: |
Stelzenhaus Madrid inkl. Podest Veranda, Schlafboden, Rutsche detaillierte Montageanleitung |
Aufbauhinweis:
Das Spielhaus sollte auf einen geeigneten, ebenen Untergrund platziert werden, keinesfalls direkt auf den Rasen. Dauerhafte Nässe von unten ist unbedingt zu vermeiden. Lies hierzu unseren Ratgeber und nimm für den Aufbau immer die mitgelieferte Montageanleitung zur Hand.
Bitte beachte, dass der Aufbau/Anstrich dieses Spielhauses nur bei folgenden Witterungsbegebenheiten erfolgen sollte: Temperaturen über mehrere Tage hinweg über + 5 °C und relativer Luftfeuchtigkeit < 80 %. Andernfalls könnte sich das Holz deines Spielhauses verziehen.
Lieferzeit: 2-3 Wochen
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4.4 ★★★★★
Based on 9 reviews
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Product Reviews
★★★★★ 5
Transcends the Historiography on the Constitution
Format: Hardcover
“This is the most important book to be written on the Constitution since Gordon Wood’s Creation.”
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Reviewed in the United States on May 9, 2020
★★★★★ 2
I Really Wanted to Like This, But...
Format: Audiobook
My 2 star review is entirely due to the audio performance. While the premise and scholarly research in this book is fascinating, the narration is anything but. The narrator speaks, and at times even PERFORMS, every "quote" and "unquote" no matter where they are in the text. In a long (20 hours) book relying heavily on quotations, this narrative choice dramatically detracts from the listener's ability to absorb the material. One wonders why he doesn't say, "period," after every sentence! In addition, he sounds like he's spraying a lot of spit at the mike while speaking. Yes, euw.
I listen to 3-8 audiobooks a week, and have done so since the early 1990s, so this isn't my first, or even my first scholarly, audiobook. The better narrators designate quoted text with a shift in vocal tone or slight pause. If you are considering this book, I hope you choose the print version.
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Reviewed in the United States on November 5, 2021
★★★★★ 3
Good to excellent content - terrible publishing policy
Format: Hardcover
Lewis (Not "Flewis") wrote a decent text a number of years ago. It was then expanded to a companion volume (Analytical Sedimentology) with another author. The two nicely complement each other but the mind boggles at a price of almost $100 per each. The publisher has clearly made little effort to control the cost. Redundancy between the two volumes is excessive, hard cover rather than soft is used and, indeed, both could easily have been combined in one less pricey volume. A valuable resource to students and professionals has therefore been compromised by publisher, author or both due to ignorance, greed or stupidity. A terrible shame!
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Reviewed in the United States on January 5, 1998
★★★★★ 5
An Excellent Introduction to Legal and Constitutional Reasoning
Format: Hardcover
This is an excellent introductory volume for people who feel confused by the debate over "original intent" versus a "living Constitution." David A. Strauss is a law professor at the University of Chicago. His book is a quick read (139 pages), with no notes, bibliography or other impedimenta - just an index. It's a very lucid explanation of legal reasoning and how the Supreme Court has followed this basic process over time. Hence the "living constitution" is really just an instance of the English common law tradition functioning normally. This book will teach many Americans how legal reasoning actually operates in practice. It is a common-sensical and conservative process that seeks at once to promote predictability and fairness. By and large, it has worked well.
The phrase "living Constitution" has been denigrated by people who seek to turn back the calendar to a day when more "traditional" values were imposed by law. In so doing, they have invoked an historical fiction, the "original intent" of the framers of the Constitution. The myriad problems arising from this effort, if not its disingenuousness, have been discussed with insight and erudition by such excellent minds as Jack Rakove ("Original Meanings")and Akhil Reed Amar ("The Bill of Rights," and "The American Constitution: A Biography"), to name just two.
The real point of this book, I think, is to explain basic legal reasoning to a mass audience. This does a great service. It also shows how naturally the common law evolves, how it tends to restrain judicial activism and yet to permit flexibility as times and circumstances change. As Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School put it in his book, "The Spirit of the Common Law," the common law is "essentially a mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a mode of treating legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules...." This is a critical distinction. Some so-called conservatives insist that judges must simply apply the law like automatons, as if it were a "fixed body of definite rules." They then seek to enlist the founding fathers in declaring what those rules are, or how definite they must be. But as Dean Pound and centuries of legal history demonstrate, this notion is far removed from the truth, and remote from any useful notion of adjudication. All Anglophone law schools, lawyers and judges are engaged in the process Dean Pound discusses.
The common law tradition arose in England over the course of centuries. We imported it to this country in part because it was workable and practical, and because it was brilliantly and systematically expounded by Chief Justice Edward Coke in the 17th century and by Lord William Blackstone shortly before the American Revolution. No one would suggest that the common law tradition means the law is the captive of judges' subjective whims. Such an assertion would have sounded ludicrous to the English as well as to the founders. But as Strauss - and volumes of legal history - unsurprisingly demonstrate, the common law tradition is the key to constitutional interpretation.
The common law is an inherently conservative instrument. It evolves incrementally. Those who complain about the "living Constitution" argue that judges merely rule according to their subjective prejudices. They contend that it is the legislative branch that should be charged with interpreting the Constitution. Of course, all three branches of government must interpret the Constitution from time to time. But the legislative branch should not have the last word in determining whether its own enactments meet constitutional scrutiny: To borrow from Chief Justice Coke, no one (including the legislature) may be the judge of his own cause. The function of determining whether legislation conforms to the Constitution has been and still is wisely confided to the courts, which by virtue of centuries of practice (as reflected in published opinions) have substantial expertise in the area and are independent. One also hears complaints that judges are insulated from reality. But courts are not insulated - they are independent. And they are independent precisely so they are not subject to being influenced by lobbyists or terrified by a challenger in a primary election.
To show how the common law works, Strauss discusses the evolution of constitutional thought in relation to two major issues: freedom of speech and segregation in public schools. He explains how the "clear and present danger" test in freedom of speech cases evolved, implicating not just such considerations as the threat of imminent harm, but also that some kinds of speech have lower societal value (libel, obscenity, fighting words), while other kinds of speech have more societal value (great literature, political speech).
Strauss goes on to discuss how Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was far less a radical overturning of an entrenched precedent, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), than a logical step in the development of the law. In so doing, he uses an example from the law of torts, where customers injured by dangerous products originally were barred from suing the manufacturer unless they had a contractual relationship with it. At first, the fact that a product was inherently dangerous overcame the requirement of a contractual relationship. As it became harder to draw a line between ordinary products and those that were inherently dangerous, however, the old requirement of a contractual relationship was found to have outworn its purpose and customers were permitted to sue the manufacturer who had created a foreseeable risk of harm. Thus, in products liability cases, as in racial equality cases, the law evolved to meet the new demands posed by changed circumstances. Strauss shows the development of the law by discussing cases on racial equality decided after Plessy that gradually undercut the Plessy decision until it was no longer tenable.
Strauss does what law professors do every day: teach the law by showing how it evolved. His explanation, however, is so concise and clear that it makes the discussion seem not just sensible but compelling. Thus we see that the law works.
As Strauss points out, we never wrangle over some constitutional issues because they are cut and dried (you have to be 30 years old to be a senator) or because certainty is required (January 20 is the day the new president takes office, no matter how unstable the current domestic or world situation). Other provisions require more effort to interpret, but this is because the founders brilliantly provided that some matters could be spelled out specifically in advance, while others would have to be expressed in more general terms, which could be adjusted to changing needs and times (e.g., the "necessary and proper" clause in Article I, Sec. 8).
Interestingly, Strauss does not consider amendments to the Constitution to be part of what makes it a living document, since the amendment process is so onerous, slow, and seldom used. He points out how some amendments merely ratified the status quo, or served to clean up outliers, resolved technical issues, or were ahead of their time. As he offers these judgments, which seem balanced and reasonable, he also explains some of the less familiar amendments in a way that will have readers raising their eyebrows and saying "Oh, so that's where that came from."
At the outset of the book, Strauss sets out three objections to originalism:
That it is often, as a practical matter, impossible even for professional historians to discover what the intentions were of various founders with respect to matters discussed in the Constitution.
That even if an intent of the founders could be discovered, it would pertain to the understanding they had about their world: how does one go about trying to fit that understanding to our world?
That as Thomas Jefferson pointed out, one generation is to another as one sovereign nation is to another. The world belongs to the living. The notions of people long dead cannot bind us in the present or future.
Strauss correctly observes that the third of these objections is by itself fatal to originalism.
The founders were not so impressed with themselves that they felt their "intentions" should be forever imposed on posterity. Had they been dedicated to such a dubious project, they would surely have done a better job of documenting their debates and compromises during the Philadelphia convention. But little remains of those deliberations aside from the notes kept by James Madison. The Constitution, moreover, reflects their understanding that the future could not be shackled forever to the time in which they lived. They realized that the slave trade, for example, would prove intolerable and therefore provided that it could be abolished by at least 1808. So was their "original intent" to permit the slave trade, or was it that the slave trade should be abolished? And what does this say, if anything, about their intentions toward the institution of slavery - a word that did not even appear in the Constitution until the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted in 1865?
Most damning of all to the originalist position is what Thomas Jefferson said on the subject.
In a letter dated July 12, 1816, to Samuel Kercheval, Jefferson wrote
"Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors."
He added, "Let us follow no such examples nor weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs." He even called for revision of the constitution at stated periods.
While originalists would love to claim Jefferson as one of their own, his words - and indeed his whole life - prove that he was completely at odds with their approach.
Men like Jefferson and Franklin, who were devotees of science, were fascinated by the progress men could make in trying to understand and improve their lives. Jefferson was an eager student of nature and did considerable experimentation with crops on his plantation. He famously wrote his "Notes on the State of Virginia" to refute the widely read claims of the French naturalist Buffon about the supposedly weak, degenerate, and insipid life forms to be found in the New World. The idea that such men, who were committed to the growth of knowledge, would seek to confine all future generations to the limited understanding they possessed of the universe in 1787, is worse than laughable. It can only be explained by the polemical purposes of those whose arguments for a regressive social order are so feeble that they have to seek refuge behind an imaginary "original intent" that they erect - as if the founders wanted their limited knowledge and often unarticulated, conflicting, or ambivalent intentions to restrict the great national experiment forever.
Given the explicit language of Thomas Jefferson, quoted above, it is apparent that "originalism" actually belies and defies the express intent of Jefferson, one of the most eminent of the founders. It seems paradoxical but it was his original intent that his original intent should not govern future generations!
Original intent also appears anomalously restrictive when one considers that the founders never contemplated the existence of an Air Force, though they expressly provided for the Army and the Navy. And ask an originalist what the original intent was with respect to the Second Amendment's use of the term "arms." The founders had no concept of assault rifles or machine guns, let alone nerve gas, laser-guided bombs, predator drones, or nuclear weapons. How do we impose an intention on them to assert what they could not have foreseen, namely, that ordinary householders in the 21st century should have a personal, constitutional right to be able to obliterate a small army in a matter of seconds, based on the founders' notions about the 18th century saber, musket or pistol? Likewise, the Eleventh Amendment says nothing to prohibit a person from suing her own state - just other states. Yet even "textualists" read an unwritten provision into the Eleventh Amendment because it suits their view of how "sovereign" the states should be. When given this kind of a taste of their own medicine, originalists collapse in helpless sputtering and exasperation.
Exposed to Strauss' very sensible discussion, the concerns of originalists reflect opportunism and disingenuousness. After all, we should not expect lawyers and judges to become armchair historians, especially under the time pressures of litigation and in the face of hotly contested issues. We should not pretend the founders had some monolithic intent, least of all with respect to matters of which they had no concept. And as Jefferson pointed out, the relationship of one generation to another is like that of one sovereign nation to another: we cannot expect to bind future generations by the intentions of people who are long since dead.
In short, there will always be those who resist change and those who welcome it. If you really want to see "judicial activism" at work, you will not find much of it in the common law tradition. A far better example is the recent decision - by the so-called conservatives on the Supreme Court - in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
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Reviewed in the United States on May 18, 2010
★★★★★ 5
An Excellent Read
Format: Kindle
The author talks about our constitution as a "living document" and expertly draws the distinction between this and the originalist interpretation as a "dead document."
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Reviewed in the United States on October 5, 2018