SKU: 59058897133

LV429844

Sale price$138.65 Regular price$154.06
Save 10%

Pay in installments of $38.52 with ShopPay, AfterPay and Klarna

Shipping Estimate
USA
  • USA
  • CAN

Ships within 48 hours · Estimated delivery Aug 6 - Aug 11

Promo Codes Available:

For Your Every Summer RSVP, with Code: SUMMER15

Description

LV429844Main Range Compact Product name Compact NSX Product or component type Circuit breaker Device short name Compact NSX100N Device application Distribution Poles description 3P Protected poles description 3t Network type AC Network frequency 50 60 Hz [In] rated current 100 A at 40 C [Ui] rated insulation voltage 800 V AC 50 60 Hz [Uimp] rated impulse withstand voltage 8 kV [Ue] rated operational voltage 690 V AC 50 60 Hz Breaking capacity code N 50 kA 415

Main
Range Compact
Product name Compact NSX
Product or component type Circuit breaker
Device short name Compact NSX100N
Device application Distribution
Poles description 3P
Protected poles description 3t
Network type AC
Network frequency 50/60 Hz
[In] rated current 100 A at 40 °C
[Ui] rated insulation voltage 800 V AC 50/60 Hz
[Uimp] rated impulse withstand voltage 8 kV
[Ue] rated operational voltage 690 V AC 50/60 Hz
Breaking capacity code N 50 kA 415 V AC
Breaking capacity 85 kA at 240 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to UL 508
10 kA Icu at 660/690 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
35 kA Icu at 525 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
20 kA at 600 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to UL 508
50 kA at 480 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to UL 508
36 kA Icu at 500 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
50 kA Icu at 380/415 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
50 kA Icu at 440 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
90 kA Icu at 220/240 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
[Ics] rated service breaking capacity 10 kA at 660/690 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
35 kA at 525 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
36 kA at 500 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
50 kA at 380/415 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
50 kA at 440 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
90 kA at 220/240 V AC 50/60 Hz conforming to IEC 60947-2
Suitability for isolation Yes conforming to EN 60947-2
Yes conforming to IEC 60947-2
Utilisation category Category A
Trip unit name TM-D
Trip unit technology Thermal-magnetic
Trip unit protection functions LI
Pollution degree 3 conforming to IEC 60664-1
Complementary
Control type Toggle
Mounting mode Fixed
Mounting support Backplate
Upside connection Front
Downside connection Front
Auxiliary contact composition Without
Mechanical durability 50000 cycles
Electrical durability 10000 cycles 690 V In conforming to IEC 60947-2
20000 cycles 690 V In/2 conforming to IEC 60947-2
30000 cycles 440 V In conforming to IEC 60947-2
50000 cycles 440 V In/2 conforming to IEC 60947-2
Connection pitch 35 mm
Local signalling Positive contact indication
Protection type L : for overload protection (thermal)
I : for short-circuit protection (magnetic)
Trip unit rating 40 A at 40 °C
Long time pick-up adjustment type Ir Adjustable
Long time pick-up adjustment range 0.7...1 x In
Long time delay adjustment type Fixed
[tr] long-time delay adjustment range 120…400 s at 1.5 x In
15 s at 6 x Ir
Short-time pick-up adjustment type Isd Fixed
[Isd] short-time pick-up adjustment range 500 A
Short-time delay adjustment type Fixed
Height 161 mm
Width 105 mm
Depth 86 mm
Net weight 2.05 kg
Compatibility code NSX100
Environment
Overvoltage category Class II
Electrical shock protection class Class II
Standards EN/IEC 60947
UL 508
Product certifications EAC
Marine
CCC
IP degree of protection IP40 conforming to IEC 60529
IK degree of protection IK07 conforming to IEC 62262
Ambient air temperature for operation -35…70 °C
Ambient air temperature for storage -55…85 °C
Offer Sustainability
Sustainable offer status Green Premium product
REACh Regulation
REACh Declaration
EU RoHS Directive Pro-active compliance (Product out of EU RoHS legal scope)
EU RoHS Declaration
Mercury free Yes
RoHS exemption information
Yes
China RoHS Regulation
China RoHS declaration
Environmental Disclosure
Product Environmental Profile
Circularity Profile
End of Life Information
Contractual warranty
Warranty 18 months
Shipping Notes
  • Free Standard Shipping on $100+ Orders to the USA.
  • Except Preorder products are shipped in 48 hours.
  • Delivery to the USA:
  1. Standard Shipping : 3-10 business days
  • If time is of the essence, please consider selecting expedited delivery for faster service.
Exchange/Return Notes
  • We offer a 30-day return/exchange service after receiving.
  • Final sale items are not eligible for returns or exchanges.
  • To process your return/exchange, please contact us at [email protected]
  • Please click here for more details>>> Return & Exchange Policy
SKU: 59058897133

Discover Niche Categories That Outsell

Top-Converting Item to Boost Your Average Order

4.3 ★★★★★
Based on 28 reviews
Sort
Highest Rating
Newest First
Oldest First
Product Reviews
A
Verified Purchase
Albert
Massapequa, US
★★★★★ 4
Intriguing Challenges and Overblown Rhetoric
This is a useful book to read. The principles of warfare advocated by Sun Tzu say that you must know both yourself and your enemy. This book shows that modern American society is known by the Chinese military. As an exercise in cultural self-understanding alone, reading it pays dividends. However, the topic is strategy. The words used can be relatively confusing at times, not quite embodying the meaning given to them by the authors. Unlimited...but within limits. Unrestricted...but following rules. It can be a bit of a struggle to follow their train of thought and understand their meaning (especially with the writing style, which lacks clarity or organization). Despite this I think it is worth struggling with, and especially with a broad overview of some of the argument to assist. Such a board overview follows. The main point: the United States is prone to think in a manner which intrinsically restricts the conduct of warfare to only a formal military domain; thus it abstracts military action from its location in social domains (politics, economy, information, etc). This fits rather well. We like things to be formulas or mechanistic. We also like to abstract them away into separate ("rigidly distinct") boxes which have no interaction. And so, the military is responsible for military problems and better stay far from anything approaching politics! However, as the authors reveal, this leads to an inability to conduct grander strategy in warfare. So instead: "unrestricted" warfare is to have strategy incorporate considerations (and interactions) within various domains, not only the military domain. Basically it is a rejection of the post-Westphalian concept of the nation-state as the supreme (and exclusive) kind of agent in strategy. This is good. The post-Westphalian idea of the nation-state may be useful in certain contexts and for certain purposes, but it is NOT the comprehensive reality of the universe. To treat it as such is to be blind to much of reality, and to live in a fantasy world. Does North Korea really care that it is "unrecognized" as a nation by us? Nope. Because the nation-state idea simply doesn't describe the order in which NK exists, so much as it describes the order in which Germany exists. This is all well and good. But is it truly revolutionary or new? I don't think so. Clausewitz himself writes that there is no military situation abstracted from the political situation, and politics (in this sense) involves much more than just inter-governmental relations. Rather, I think that we can treat this as a corrective against modern American oversimplifications and reductions, and thus as a "return" to older concepts of strategy and statesmanship. Indeed, they even imitate and follow Clausewitz's guidance on method for determining a theory of warfare which is inductive/a posteriori, rather than deductive/a priori. Unfortunately, the one "modern" example of a war they have to analyze is the Gulf War, and so they relentlessly analyze it alone, perhaps leading to imbalance. And here is where the rhetoric is overblown. This is no "master plan" to destroy America (false advertising). It's not even really new concepts. Rather, it is a (very) forceful reminder against the false (and harmful) modernist sentiments that prevail in America's mode of conducting warfare. In reference to false understandings, the authors actually accuse Americans of "touching the elephant" - an allusion to the tale of "blind men and the elephant" (although this allusion is not made clear in the text, and so is confusing if you have not heard of the tale). It is a parable about believing one has the absolute truth, while only having a limited perspective. Perhaps the authors also touch the elephant in a few ways (bias for helicopters without empirical evidence, a near-religious adoration of the golden ratio, etc.). There's a final point of balance that is perhaps needed. It is easy to either dismiss the Chinese critiques of American society ("we don't worship tech") or take them too seriously ("tech is evil"). Either reaction is problematic. Instead we need to understand that just as in some other areas, there is a rhetorical/political purpose at play. America is being made fun of (which means that the critiques are both based in reality, but also somewhat biased for the sake of local humor). Technology is not evil, and technology is not God. So we need to learn to avoid seeing technological advancement as a replacement for people (this is the error the authors would like to point out). This doesn't mean avoiding technological advancement. There are many lessons to be learned from this book. I'd advise it for all military officers to read. However, I also would advise to temper the expectations and reframe the reader's conception of what the book is: it is an exercise in recovery of some older strategic concepts, not a revolutionary approach to destroying the United States. Get past and ignore the rhetoric and advertising, and take the lessons where they make valid points about where we can be short-sighted in our mindset. But don't discount those lessons because of the wild rhetoric and advertising which surround them. Doing this, you will profit.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on September 1, 2022
C
Verified Purchase
CliffB
Grantham, US
★★★★★ 5
China’s Global Strategic Approach.
Provides an excellent understanding of China’s strategy approach — which should be occurs by now, but isn’t. Its style is probably to Asian to be appreciated by most Americans — who have never studied the classic Asian way of war — and never been to war in Asia. If interested in this subject, start with Sun Tzu, and try to think like about strategy the way the Chinese understand it.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on February 3, 2026
T
Verified Purchase
Tim
Draper, US
★★★★★ 5
Why China is winning
Format: Hardcover
Should be mandatory reading for all men from 17 and up see why they’re going to overtake the USA unless we get our act in gear
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on May 29, 2026
M
Verified Purchase
mad_buyer
Waukegan, US
★★★★★ 5
Outstanding book that lays out a blueprint for communist China's war against the US
A short book that sometimes slips into expressions that take a little time to understand, the two political officers that wrote this book had truly studied US (and western) military campaigns and political movements in order to develop strategies to defeat the west without kinetic warfare. While I (like most others, I believe) understood that CCP wanted to take advantage of the US and have region dominance, this book really opened my eyes. I'll merely list the areas in which these two political officers promoted engagement against the US/west - actions that many (including myself) never realizing these were acts of "unrestricted" and comprehensive warfare. The list: diplomatic warfare financial warfare conventional warfare network warfare trade warfare bio-chemical warfare intelligence warfare resource warfare ecological warfare psychological warfare economic aid warfare space warfare tactical warfare regulatory warfare electronic warfare smuggling warfare sanction warfare guerrilla warfare drug warfare media warfare terrorist warfare virtual warfare (deterrence) ideological warfare fabrication warfare cultural warfare international law warfare atomic warfare Of course, as one recognizes these listed arenas of engagement communist China has with the US, remember that espionage and propaganda play key roles in all of these areas. While the US seeks to counter communist China individually in several of these areas, we have to realize that it is a comprehensive strategy that the CCP is pursuing. Remember this book was published in 1999. What has each side engaged in since then? Epiphanal!
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on December 16, 2022
W
Verified Purchase
Walter W. Olson, Ph.D, P.E.
Grantham, US
★★★★★ 3
A military reading: The cover is misleading
This book is purported to be a translation of China’s Masterplan to Destroy America written by two Colonels in the People’s Liberation Army in 1999. There is reason, but not confirmed, to doubt this. The authors of the book are clearly Chinese. Whether or not the authors are Colonels in the PLA, I feel, is in doubt, as such a plan would never be available to Western sources as quickly as it was after drafting. The book is no “master plan.” It is a discussion of modern warfare strategy written by readers of the worldwide military strategy publications. Most of the publications have been in the United States and China. The cover of this book is misleading with the statement, “Wake up, America.” This book should be little interest to the non-military American. But it should be read by anyone with potential requirements for field grade service (Major and above,) or higher (and equivalent strategy levels in the Marines, Air Force, and Navy.) As far as “Wake Up,” I can recall discussions about strategy that contained most of the information provided within the book as a staff field grade officer in the US Army. While as military officers, we need to be aware of these issues, we are not entirely ignorant of them. The book provides a somewhat different perspective of the issues from a Chinese viewpoint. The first point the authors make, how technology precedes its best employment in warfare. Most of the technology discussed concerns the information processing capabilities of both computers and software. It is more than computerized warfare. A large part of this is based on the technology to US Forces but not entirely. Part of the problem with technology is that mankind becomes so used to using technology to solve today’s problems that previous methods of solving problems are lost. Thus, if the technology can be crippled, it represents an exploitable weakness in war. The second point made, is that the military forces now must consider nonmilitary actions if it is to be effective in both defense and offense. Warfare developed from point battlefields (using swords, knives, etc.,) to linear battlefields (using machine guns and artillery,) to area battlefields, to 3D battlefields (using aircraft and missiles,) to modern infinite-dimensional battlefields which include space, electromagnetic spectrums, and civilian actions. If one can start a war in a computer room or a stock exchange, is there a non-battle space anywhere? Warfare that transcends military boundaries is “unrestricted warfare.” A “kinder warfare” with critical attacks that take no lives is now possible. Technology is providing a means to attack and enemy’s nerve centers without directly harming anything else. Such nerve centers exist in an enemy’s financial systems, their economic systems, their environmental systems, their public media systems, their political systems, their power and energy systems, and their logistics centers. A third point made is that coalitions of disparate forces, internationally, nationally, and military, are formed and broken very quickly, as quickly as within 24 hours! For example, in Desert Storm, the United States weaved together more than 30 nations in various roles. The author’s prescient comment foresaw the alignments that occurred immediately following the 9/11 attack, although this was after the book was written and not available to the authors to use as an example. There was also unity of command established. This, the authors say, stemmed from the US DoD Reorganization Act passed by Congress in 1986. All of the air forces and naval forces were under General Schwartzkopf despite the desires of the individual forces to operate independently. The air tasking order (a 300-page document) drafted in joint sessions by the Air Force, Navy and Marines, had to be approved by General Schwartzkopf before commands were issued to the various forces. The Kuwaiti Invasion Plan that the Marines wanted was put off in favor of the plan that General Schwartzkopf endorsed. Media personnel were incorporated into the military units but controlled with definitions of release timing and content. A fourth point is that Americans want wars which achieve its national interests while having no causalities. This promotes an over-reliance on technology and an unwillingness to support prolonged war. Americans have a blind faith in technology always thinking that the road to victory is with the highest technology weapons. American military budgets are based largely on the acquisition of expensive weapon systems, and little thought given to their integrated use within the military services. American military theory is behind (consistent with point one above.) But the overriding goal is victory without casualties. Thus, the authors recommend that the secret to war with America is to kill its rank and file soldiers. The style of the book is somewhat elliptical: it is written in the Chinese manner which often dances around a subject before coming to its subject. For example, there is a discussion of the Golden Ratio (1:0.618) before the authors show how it can be found in various ancient and modern military operations. There is considerable Chinese military philosophy discussed including the 36 Strategies, which most American military readers have not encountered ( did not at West Point when I was a Cadet studying Chinese!) I first encountered these after a reference from a Chinese Professor while I was teaching in China and then read Sun Tzu in Chinese. Sun Tzu was not the original author of these. In my personal opinion, an English translation this short book should be required reading for all Cadets at West Point. I rate the book 3 stars for several reasons. I don’t feel the book is well written. Many of the references are transliterations of the author’s names in Chinese which do not read as the real names. At this time, the book is somewhat dated having been written in 1999. I also doubt the attribution of the source and authors of the book. The concepts presented in the book are worth thinking about for a person developing military strategies.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on September 16, 2019

recommand products