SKU: 83869076035

Custom Dynamics Probeam® Low Profile Led Taillight With Bottom Window

Name: Custom Dynamics Probeam® Low Profile Led Taillight With Bottom Window
Brand: 2pierres.com
SKU: 83869076035
Price: 3217.50 USD
Availability: InStock
Rating: 4.5553 (6 reviews)

$2895.75 $3217.50

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Description

Custom Dynamics Probeam® Low Profile Led Taillight With Bottom WindowFeatures 5 light pipes illuminated across the taillight as the constant on running light Low Profile design protrudes only two inches from the stock taillight baseplate License plate illumination window located at the bottom of the lens 25 separate LEDs provide a full contrast brake light Replacement gasket and nylon washers included Plug and play installation Fitments YEAR MAKE MODEL 2020 2024 Harley Davidson Road Glide Limited FLTRK 2020 2024 Harley

Features

5 light pipes illuminated across the taillight as the constant on running light
Low-Profile design protrudes only two inches from the stock taillight baseplate
License plate illumination window located at the bottom of the lens
25 separate LEDs provide a full contrast brake light
Replacement gasket and nylon washers included
Plug and play installation

Fitments

YEAR	MAKE	MODEL
2020-2024	Harley-Davidson	Road Glide Limited FLTRK
2020-2024	Harley-Davidson	Softail Low Rider S FXLRS
2020-2022	Harley-Davidson	CVO Tri Glide FLHTCUTGSE
2018-2021	Harley-Davidson	Softail Heritage Classic FLHC
2018-2021	Harley-Davidson	Softail Heritage Classic 114 FLHCS
2018-2020	Harley-Davidson	Softail Low Rider FXLR
2016-2017	Harley-Davidson	Fat Boy S FLSTFBS
2015-2019	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Ultra Limited Low FLHTKL
2014-2017	Harley-Davidson	SuperLow 1200 XLT
2014-2016, 2021	Harley-Davidson	CVO Electra Glide Ultra Limited FLHTKSE
2014-2016	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Ultra Classic Low FLHTCUL
2014	Harley-Davidson	CVO Road King FLHRSE
2013	Harley-Davidson	CVO Road King FLHRSE5
2013	Harley-Davidson	CVO Electra Glide Ultra Classic FLHTCUSE8
2012-2016	Harley-Davidson	Switchback FLD
2012	Harley-Davidson	CVO Electra Glide Ultra Classic FLHTCUSE7
2011-2019	Harley-Davidson	883 SuperLow XLL
2011-2013, 2016-2019	Harley-Davidson	Road Glide Ultra FLTRU
2011, 2015-2016	Harley-Davidson	CVO Road Glide Ultra FLTRUSE
2011	Harley-Davidson	CVO Electra Glide Ultra Classic FLHTCUSE6
2010-2024	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Ultra Limited FLHTK
2010-2011	Harley-Davidson	Street Glide Trike FLHXXX
2010	Harley-Davidson	CVO Electra Glide Ultra Classic FLHTCUSE5
2009-2024	Harley-Davidson	Tri Glide Ultra Classic FLHTCUTG
2009-2017	Harley-Davidson	Fat Boy Lo FLSTFB
2009-2013	Harley-Davidson	Road King Classic FLHRC
2009	Harley-Davidson	CVO Electra Glide Ultra Classic FLHTCUSE4
2008-2011	Harley-Davidson	Softail Cross Bones FLSTSB
2008	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Electra Glide Ultra Classic FLHTCUSE3
2008	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Road King FLHRSE4
2007-2010	Harley-Davidson	Softail Custom EFI FXSTC
2007-2009	Harley-Davidson	883 EFI XL
2007	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Electra Glide Ultra Classic FLHTCUSE2
2007	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Road King FLHRSE3
2006-2011	Harley-Davidson	Street Bob FXDB
2006-2010	Harley-Davidson	883 Low EFI XLL
2006-2009	Harley-Davidson	Street Glide EFI FLHX
2006	Harley-Davidson	Street Glide FLHX
2006	Harley-Davidson	Super Glide FXD35
2006	Harley-Davidson	Softail Heritage EFI FLSTI
2006	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Fat Boy FLSTFSE2
2006	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Electra Glide Ultra Classic FLHTCUSE
2005-2014	Harley-Davidson	Super Glide Custom EFI FXDCI
2005-2006	Harley-Davidson	883 Low XLL
2005	Harley-Davidson	15th Anniversary Fat Boy FLSTF
2005	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Fat Boy FLSTFSE
2005	Harley-Davidson	Super Glide Custom FXDC
2005	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Electra Glide FLHTCSE2
2004-2010	Harley-Davidson	Super Glide EFI FXDI
2004-2009, 2014-2017	Harley-Davidson	Low Rider EFI FXDL
2004-2009	Harley-Davidson	883 Custom EFI XLC
2004-2007	Harley-Davidson	Road King Custom EFI FLHRS
2004-2006	Harley-Davidson	Road King Custom FLHRS
2004-2006	Harley-Davidson	883 XL
2004-2006	Harley-Davidson	883 Custom XLC
2004-2005	Harley-Davidson	Super Glide Sport EFI FXDXI
2004	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Electra Glide FLHTCSE
2003	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Road King FLHRSE-I2
2002-2017	Harley-Davidson	Softail Fat Boy EFI FLSTFI
2002-2003, 2005-2007	Harley-Davidson	883 Roadster XLR
2002-2003, 2005-2007	Harley-Davidson	883 Roadster EFI XLR
2002	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Road King FLHRSE-I
2001-2017	Harley-Davidson	Softail Heritage Classic EFI FLSTCI
2001-2010	Harley-Davidson	Softail Standard EFI FXSTI
2001-2009	Harley-Davidson	Softail Night Train EFI FXSTBI
2001-2003	Harley-Davidson	Super Glide T-Sport FXDXT
2001	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Road Glide FLTRSE-I2
2000-2009, 2019-2022	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Standard EFI FLHTI
2000	Harley-Davidson	Screamin' Eagle Road Glide FLTRSE-I
2000	Harley-Davidson	FXR 4
1999-2021	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Police FLHTPI
1999-2008	Harley-Davidson	Road Glide EFI FLTR
1999-2006	Harley-Davidson	Road Glide FLTR
1999-2006	Harley-Davidson	Softail Night Train FXSTB
1999-2006	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Police FLHTP
1999-2005	Harley-Davidson	Super Glide Sport FXDX
1999	Harley-Davidson	FXR 2
1999	Harley-Davidson	FXR 3
1998-2013	Harley-Davidson	Road King Classic EFI FLHRC
1996-2003	Harley-Davidson	1200 Sport XLS
1996	Harley-Davidson	Tour Glide Ultra Classic EFI FLTCU
1995-2022	Harley-Davidson	Road King EFI FLHR
1995-2019	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Ultra Classic EFI FLHTCUI
1995-2013	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Classic EFI FLHTCI
1995-2006	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Standard FLHT
1995-2006	Harley-Davidson	Super Glide FXD
1995-2000	Harley-Davidson	Dyna Convertible FXDS-CONV
1994-2006	Harley-Davidson	Road King FLHR
1994-2006	Harley-Davidson	Low Rider FXDL
1994-1996	Harley-Davidson	Softail Heritage Special FLSTN
1993	Harley-Davidson	Softail Nostalgia FLSTN
1990-2006	Harley-Davidson	Softail Fat Boy FLSTF
1990-1996	Harley-Davidson	Tour Glide Ultra Classic FLTCU
1990-1993	Harley-Davidson	Low Rider Convertible FXRS-CONV
1990-1993	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Sport FLHS
1989-2006	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Ultra Classic FLHTCU
1989-2006	Harley-Davidson	Softail Heritage Classic FLSTC
1989-1994	Harley-Davidson	Super Glide FXR
1989-1994	Harley-Davidson	Low Rider Custom FXLR
1989-1993	Harley-Davidson	Low Rider Sport FXRS-SP
1989-1993	Harley-Davidson	Low Rider FXRS
1989-1993	Harley-Davidson	Sport Glide FXRT
1989-1990, 2006	Harley-Davidson	Softail Heritage FLST
1988-2006	Harley-Davidson	Electra Glide Classic FLHTC
1988-2003	Harley-Davidson	883 Hugger XLH
1988-2003	Harley-Davidson	Sportster 1200 XLH
1988-2003	Harley-Davidson	Sportster 883 XLH
1988-1999	Harley-Davidson	Softail Custom FXSTC
1988-1995	Harley-Davidson	883 Deluxe XLH
1988-1990, 1999-2006	Harley-Davidson	Softail Standard FXST

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Product Reviews

Verified Purchase

Connie Jones

Waukegan, US

★★★★★ 5

Transcends the Historiography on the Constitution

Format: Hardcover

“This is the most important book to be written on the Constitution since Gordon Wood’s Creation.”

WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare

Reviewed in the United States on May 9, 2020

moxielady

Lexington, US

★★★★★ 2

I Really Wanted to Like This, But...

Format: Audiobook

My 2 star review is entirely due to the audio performance. While the premise and scholarly research in this book is fascinating, the narration is anything but. The narrator speaks, and at times even PERFORMS, every "quote" and "unquote" no matter where they are in the text. In a long (20 hours) book relying heavily on quotations, this narrative choice dramatically detracts from the listener's ability to absorb the material. One wonders why he doesn't say, "period," after every sentence! In addition, he sounds like he's spraying a lot of spit at the mike while speaking. Yes, euw. I listen to 3-8 audiobooks a week, and have done so since the early 1990s, so this isn't my first, or even my first scholarly, audiobook. The better narrators designate quoted text with a shift in vocal tone or slight pause. If you are considering this book, I hope you choose the print version.

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Reviewed in the United States on November 5, 2021

[email protected]

Lexington, US

★★★★★ 3

Good to excellent content - terrible publishing policy

Format: Hardcover

Lewis (Not "Flewis") wrote a decent text a number of years ago. It was then expanded to a companion volume (Analytical Sedimentology) with another author. The two nicely complement each other but the mind boggles at a price of almost $100 per each. The publisher has clearly made little effort to control the cost. Redundancy between the two volumes is excessive, hard cover rather than soft is used and, indeed, both could easily have been combined in one less pricey volume. A valuable resource to students and professionals has therefore been compromised by publisher, author or both due to ignorance, greed or stupidity. A terrible shame!

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Reviewed in the United States on January 5, 1998

Verified Purchase

JMB1014

Dallas, US

★★★★★ 5

An Excellent Introduction to Legal and Constitutional Reasoning

Format: Hardcover

This is an excellent introductory volume for people who feel confused by the debate over "original intent" versus a "living Constitution." David A. Strauss is a law professor at the University of Chicago. His book is a quick read (139 pages), with no notes, bibliography or other impedimenta - just an index. It's a very lucid explanation of legal reasoning and how the Supreme Court has followed this basic process over time. Hence the "living constitution" is really just an instance of the English common law tradition functioning normally. This book will teach many Americans how legal reasoning actually operates in practice. It is a common-sensical and conservative process that seeks at once to promote predictability and fairness. By and large, it has worked well. The phrase "living Constitution" has been denigrated by people who seek to turn back the calendar to a day when more "traditional" values were imposed by law. In so doing, they have invoked an historical fiction, the "original intent" of the framers of the Constitution. The myriad problems arising from this effort, if not its disingenuousness, have been discussed with insight and erudition by such excellent minds as Jack Rakove ("Original Meanings")and Akhil Reed Amar ("The Bill of Rights," and "The American Constitution: A Biography"), to name just two. The real point of this book, I think, is to explain basic legal reasoning to a mass audience. This does a great service. It also shows how naturally the common law evolves, how it tends to restrain judicial activism and yet to permit flexibility as times and circumstances change. As Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School put it in his book, "The Spirit of the Common Law," the common law is "essentially a mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a mode of treating legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules...." This is a critical distinction. Some so-called conservatives insist that judges must simply apply the law like automatons, as if it were a "fixed body of definite rules." They then seek to enlist the founding fathers in declaring what those rules are, or how definite they must be. But as Dean Pound and centuries of legal history demonstrate, this notion is far removed from the truth, and remote from any useful notion of adjudication. All Anglophone law schools, lawyers and judges are engaged in the process Dean Pound discusses. The common law tradition arose in England over the course of centuries. We imported it to this country in part because it was workable and practical, and because it was brilliantly and systematically expounded by Chief Justice Edward Coke in the 17th century and by Lord William Blackstone shortly before the American Revolution. No one would suggest that the common law tradition means the law is the captive of judges' subjective whims. Such an assertion would have sounded ludicrous to the English as well as to the founders. But as Strauss - and volumes of legal history - unsurprisingly demonstrate, the common law tradition is the key to constitutional interpretation. The common law is an inherently conservative instrument. It evolves incrementally. Those who complain about the "living Constitution" argue that judges merely rule according to their subjective prejudices. They contend that it is the legislative branch that should be charged with interpreting the Constitution. Of course, all three branches of government must interpret the Constitution from time to time. But the legislative branch should not have the last word in determining whether its own enactments meet constitutional scrutiny: To borrow from Chief Justice Coke, no one (including the legislature) may be the judge of his own cause. The function of determining whether legislation conforms to the Constitution has been and still is wisely confided to the courts, which by virtue of centuries of practice (as reflected in published opinions) have substantial expertise in the area and are independent. One also hears complaints that judges are insulated from reality. But courts are not insulated - they are independent. And they are independent precisely so they are not subject to being influenced by lobbyists or terrified by a challenger in a primary election. To show how the common law works, Strauss discusses the evolution of constitutional thought in relation to two major issues: freedom of speech and segregation in public schools. He explains how the "clear and present danger" test in freedom of speech cases evolved, implicating not just such considerations as the threat of imminent harm, but also that some kinds of speech have lower societal value (libel, obscenity, fighting words), while other kinds of speech have more societal value (great literature, political speech). Strauss goes on to discuss how Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was far less a radical overturning of an entrenched precedent, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), than a logical step in the development of the law. In so doing, he uses an example from the law of torts, where customers injured by dangerous products originally were barred from suing the manufacturer unless they had a contractual relationship with it. At first, the fact that a product was inherently dangerous overcame the requirement of a contractual relationship. As it became harder to draw a line between ordinary products and those that were inherently dangerous, however, the old requirement of a contractual relationship was found to have outworn its purpose and customers were permitted to sue the manufacturer who had created a foreseeable risk of harm. Thus, in products liability cases, as in racial equality cases, the law evolved to meet the new demands posed by changed circumstances. Strauss shows the development of the law by discussing cases on racial equality decided after Plessy that gradually undercut the Plessy decision until it was no longer tenable. Strauss does what law professors do every day: teach the law by showing how it evolved. His explanation, however, is so concise and clear that it makes the discussion seem not just sensible but compelling. Thus we see that the law works. As Strauss points out, we never wrangle over some constitutional issues because they are cut and dried (you have to be 30 years old to be a senator) or because certainty is required (January 20 is the day the new president takes office, no matter how unstable the current domestic or world situation). Other provisions require more effort to interpret, but this is because the founders brilliantly provided that some matters could be spelled out specifically in advance, while others would have to be expressed in more general terms, which could be adjusted to changing needs and times (e.g., the "necessary and proper" clause in Article I, Sec. 8). Interestingly, Strauss does not consider amendments to the Constitution to be part of what makes it a living document, since the amendment process is so onerous, slow, and seldom used. He points out how some amendments merely ratified the status quo, or served to clean up outliers, resolved technical issues, or were ahead of their time. As he offers these judgments, which seem balanced and reasonable, he also explains some of the less familiar amendments in a way that will have readers raising their eyebrows and saying "Oh, so that's where that came from." At the outset of the book, Strauss sets out three objections to originalism: That it is often, as a practical matter, impossible even for professional historians to discover what the intentions were of various founders with respect to matters discussed in the Constitution. That even if an intent of the founders could be discovered, it would pertain to the understanding they had about their world: how does one go about trying to fit that understanding to our world? That as Thomas Jefferson pointed out, one generation is to another as one sovereign nation is to another. The world belongs to the living. The notions of people long dead cannot bind us in the present or future. Strauss correctly observes that the third of these objections is by itself fatal to originalism. The founders were not so impressed with themselves that they felt their "intentions" should be forever imposed on posterity. Had they been dedicated to such a dubious project, they would surely have done a better job of documenting their debates and compromises during the Philadelphia convention. But little remains of those deliberations aside from the notes kept by James Madison. The Constitution, moreover, reflects their understanding that the future could not be shackled forever to the time in which they lived. They realized that the slave trade, for example, would prove intolerable and therefore provided that it could be abolished by at least 1808. So was their "original intent" to permit the slave trade, or was it that the slave trade should be abolished? And what does this say, if anything, about their intentions toward the institution of slavery - a word that did not even appear in the Constitution until the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted in 1865? Most damning of all to the originalist position is what Thomas Jefferson said on the subject. In a letter dated July 12, 1816, to Samuel Kercheval, Jefferson wrote "Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors." He added, "Let us follow no such examples nor weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs." He even called for revision of the constitution at stated periods. While originalists would love to claim Jefferson as one of their own, his words - and indeed his whole life - prove that he was completely at odds with their approach. Men like Jefferson and Franklin, who were devotees of science, were fascinated by the progress men could make in trying to understand and improve their lives. Jefferson was an eager student of nature and did considerable experimentation with crops on his plantation. He famously wrote his "Notes on the State of Virginia" to refute the widely read claims of the French naturalist Buffon about the supposedly weak, degenerate, and insipid life forms to be found in the New World. The idea that such men, who were committed to the growth of knowledge, would seek to confine all future generations to the limited understanding they possessed of the universe in 1787, is worse than laughable. It can only be explained by the polemical purposes of those whose arguments for a regressive social order are so feeble that they have to seek refuge behind an imaginary "original intent" that they erect - as if the founders wanted their limited knowledge and often unarticulated, conflicting, or ambivalent intentions to restrict the great national experiment forever. Given the explicit language of Thomas Jefferson, quoted above, it is apparent that "originalism" actually belies and defies the express intent of Jefferson, one of the most eminent of the founders. It seems paradoxical but it was his original intent that his original intent should not govern future generations! Original intent also appears anomalously restrictive when one considers that the founders never contemplated the existence of an Air Force, though they expressly provided for the Army and the Navy. And ask an originalist what the original intent was with respect to the Second Amendment's use of the term "arms." The founders had no concept of assault rifles or machine guns, let alone nerve gas, laser-guided bombs, predator drones, or nuclear weapons. How do we impose an intention on them to assert what they could not have foreseen, namely, that ordinary householders in the 21st century should have a personal, constitutional right to be able to obliterate a small army in a matter of seconds, based on the founders' notions about the 18th century saber, musket or pistol? Likewise, the Eleventh Amendment says nothing to prohibit a person from suing her own state - just other states. Yet even "textualists" read an unwritten provision into the Eleventh Amendment because it suits their view of how "sovereign" the states should be. When given this kind of a taste of their own medicine, originalists collapse in helpless sputtering and exasperation. Exposed to Strauss' very sensible discussion, the concerns of originalists reflect opportunism and disingenuousness. After all, we should not expect lawyers and judges to become armchair historians, especially under the time pressures of litigation and in the face of hotly contested issues. We should not pretend the founders had some monolithic intent, least of all with respect to matters of which they had no concept. And as Jefferson pointed out, the relationship of one generation to another is like that of one sovereign nation to another: we cannot expect to bind future generations by the intentions of people who are long since dead. In short, there will always be those who resist change and those who welcome it. If you really want to see "judicial activism" at work, you will not find much of it in the common law tradition. A far better example is the recent decision - by the so-called conservatives on the Supreme Court - in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.

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Reviewed in the United States on May 18, 2010

Verified Purchase

Benjamin Douglass

Carnegie, US

★★★★★ 5

An Excellent Read

Format: Kindle

The author talks about our constitution as a "living document" and expertly draws the distinction between this and the originalist interpretation as a "dead document."

WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare

Reviewed in the United States on October 5, 2018